it’s funny. the issue was the same there, in many ways, as it was in afghanistan; we could not be stopped, militarily, and if we were to take an objective, we damn well took it. if we were to hold a hilltop, we damn well did. but how long can it be held and be feasible? if there are no clear lines, and the enemy cannot be pinpointed and driven back, at what point is it considered “mission complete”? how can you set the objective of training and equipping the friendly local forces to take over when you leave if they could honestly not give a shit? MILITARILY, we’ve never had a real problem. but the combat aspect is not the deciding factor in an insurgency… hearts and minds, intel gathering, psychological warfare, these all play a massive role in the fight that goes beyond the grunt on the ground.
in many ways having a massive force in the theater works against you; in terms of hearts and minds, it makes you seem to be the invader. this was one of the first mistakes we made in afghanistan; we sent in small teams to act with precision and support local forces, and it worked; between that, material and intelligence support and air strikes, we all but won, by many accounts. but then the decision was made that we needed to scale up, and history speaks for itself.
so did we lose? loaded question. in terms of politics; yes, badly. in terms of military success versus failures; iffy, and i’d even say we were continuously successful, but ultimately, to what end?
so did we lose? loaded question. in terms of politics; yes, badly. in terms of military success versus failures; iffy, and i’d even say we were continuously successful, but ultimately, to what end?